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Abstract  Monetary  unions  are  very  particular  currency  regimes,  which  aim  at  lowering  trans-
action costs  and  annulling  infra-union  exchange  risks.  Despite  its  beneﬁts,  this  exchange  rate
arrangement  is  subject  to  a  plethora  of  faults  and  weak  points  mainly  due  to  its  intrinsic
‘one-size-ﬁts-all  approach’.  In  the  past  and  perhaps  in  the  future  too,  precisely  this  core
aspect has  caused  breakups  of  previous  historical  experiences  (cf.  the  Latin,  Scandinavian  or
Austro-German  currency  union).  Now,  the  European  Monetary  Union  (EMU)  between  17  hetero-
geneous country  members  is  threatened  by  the  same  matters  of  concern.  In  the  light  of  the
ongoing debt  crisis,  theoretical  as  well  as  empirical  evidence  proves  that  at  least  nine  (for-
gotten or  even  whitewashed)  critical  assertions  apply  to  the  Euro  Area  and  its  durability.  As
we will  endeavor  to  prove,  the  Eurozone  is  seriously  endangered  by  its  missing  attention  to
heterogeneity,  divergences  and  plurality  of  actors  as  well  as  economic  needs.
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y  Monetaria  Europea  (UEM),  conformada  por  un  grupo  heterogéneo  de  17  países  miembros,  es
amenazada  por  las  mismas  cuestiones  preocupantes.  A  la  luz  de  la  actual  crisis  de  la  deuda,  la
evidencia  tanto  teórica  como  empírica  demuestra  que  al  menos  9  aﬁrmaciones  críticas  (desaten-
didas o  incluso  encubiertas)  son  aplicables  a  la  zona  Euro  y  su  permanencia.  Como  intentaremos
probar, la  Eurozona  está  seriamente  en  riesgo  por  su  falta  de  atención  a  la  heterogeneidad,  a
las divergencias  y  a  la  pluralidad  de  los  actores,  así  como  a  las  necesidades  económicas.
© 2013  Asociación  Cuadernos  de  Economía.  Publicado  por  Elsevier  España,  S.L.  Todos  los  dere-
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. Introduction
he  ‘evergreen’  economic  and  ﬁnancial  crisis  in  the  Euro
rea  has  been  at  the  origin  of  several  debates  on  cur-
ency  unions’  sustainability  (Canofari  et  al.,  2012),  which
dd  recent  evidence  to  some  earlier  scientiﬁc  warnings
Sadeh,  2003)  regarding  the  notion  of  ‘optimal  currency
rea’,  namely  the  quintessence  (or  minimum  requirement)
or  common  economic  stability.  Since  the  European  Mone-
ary  Union  (EMU)  and  its  unique  architecture  are  truly  a
ovelty  in  economic  history,  economists  as  well  as  politicians
re  still  struggling  to  ﬁnd  the  ‘magic  cure’  for  sovereign
ver-indebtedness,  sluggish  economic  growth  in  the  South
nd  overheated  member  economies  in  the  North  --  in  other
ords,  infra-European  imbalances  --  as  well  as  increasing
equests  for  ﬁnancial  help  by  EMU  countries  in  economic
rouble.  In  fact,  ‘‘[w]ith  little  experience  to  rely  upon  and
imited  theoretical  backing,  economists  and  policy-makers
ad  to  invent  practically  everything  in  little  time’’  (Wyplosz,
006).  In  order  to  entirely  grasp  the  Euro  Area’s  peculiarities
f  newness,  which  are  at  the  same  time  seriously  endan-
ering  its  sustainability,  it  should  be  reminded  that  ‘‘the
MU-project  is  unique  in  the  history  of  monetary  unions.
e  have  not  found  any  clear  and  unambiguous  historical
recedent  to  EMU,  where  a  group  of  monetary  and  politically
ndependent  countries  surrendered  their  national  currencies
o  form  a  common  monetary  union  [.  .  .] while  still  retaining
olitical  independence’’  (Bordo  and  Jonung,  1999).
Now,  the  paper  will  not  provide  any  ‘miraculous’  solu-
ion,  because  some  profound  causes  of  the  crisis  itself  seem
o  be  still  ignored.  In  fact,  policy  makers  show  the  deleteri-
us  tendency  to  (try  to)  tackle  economic  effects  without
xploring  their  origins.  This  pragmatism  leads  to  nothing
xcept  from  wasting  sizeable  ﬁnancial  resources  and  being
t  the  origin  of  generalized  distrust  in  rapid  recovery.  As
conomic  literature  has  highlighted,  the  crisis  of  the  Euro
rea  has  various  roots  and  is  aggravated  by  several  factors
f  uncertainty  and  divergence.  According  to  our  analysis,
hich  aims  at  presenting  some  sources  of  economic  disease,
t  least  nine  innovative  ﬁndings  emerge  from  studying  how
urrency  unions,  namely  the  exchange  rate  regime  adopted
y  17  European  countries,  behave  during  economic  turmoil.
et  us  therefore  enunciate  these  points,  which  will  be  ana-
yzed  separately  and  represent  the  main  elements  of  our
emorandum,  namely  an  invitation  to  memory.  In  fact,  we
laim  that: in  good  times,  currency  unions  beneﬁt  from  high
degrees  of  conﬁdence  in  reciprocal  strengths,  but  they
become  excessively  exposed  to  ﬁnancial  instability  duringeconomic  slowdowns  (Anomalous  cyclical  exposure  to
good  and  bad  times  (Section  2.1));
 communication  becomes  an  even  more  crucial  factor
to  ensure  prompt  responsiveness  to  common  economic
policies.  This  being  said,  it  is  rather  difﬁcult  to  coordi-
nate  announcements  formulated  by  a  plethora  of  national
and  supra-national  actors  (Communication  challenges  and
univocity  (Section  2.2));
 despite  any  disclaimers,  every  exchange  rate  arrange-
ment  remains  reversible.  In  other  words,  the  Euro  as  a
common  currency  can  be  anytime  reverted  to  national
money  units,  which  can  be  in  turn  be  devaluated,  but  not
mutated  into  any  others.  This  matter  of  fact  is  a  latent
threat  in  terms  of  credibility  and  conﬁdence  in  durable
economic  stability  after  monetary  uniﬁcation  (The  per-
manent  menace  of  reversibility  (Section  2.3));
 in  the  same  way  as  roped  parties  have  to  rely  on  each
climber  and  his  climbing  abilities,  currency  unions  are
subject  to  the  economic  success  of  each  member  country
(The  roped  party  effect  of  common  currencies  (Section
2.4));
 despite  the  increasing  tendency  to  common  prescriptions,
shared  currencies  suffer  the  consequences  of  ‘one-size-
ﬁts-all  solutions’  like  common  exchange  as  well  as  central
interest  rates  for  dissimilar  members  (One  size  does  not
ﬁt  all/If  it  does  not  ﬁt,  use  a  bigger  hammer!  Or  not?
(Section  2.5));
 although  economists  reduce  European  countries  to  the
Euro  Area  or  the  European  Union,  there  subsist  huge
differences  between  respective  cultures  and  societies.
These  characteristics  enrich  on  the  one  hand  Europe
itself,  but  they  are  also  responsible  for  great  conﬂict
potential  among  country  groups.  In  fact,  policy  measures
suitable  for  Northern  countries  must  not  necessarily  have
the  same  positive  effects  for  Southern  nations  and  vice
versa  (Cultural  and  social  peculiarities  as  intrinsically
tying  or  disaggregating  factors  (Section  2.6));
 the  separation  of  monetary  from  political  powers  is  inef-
fective  as  well  as  at  the  origin  of  huge  conﬂicts  (The
indivisibility  of  monetary  and  political  powers  (Section
2.7));
 since  instability  deriving  from  economic  turmoil  in  mem-
ber  countries  can  potentially  affect  the  Euro  Area  as
a  whole,  communitarian  policy  makers  will  be  (tacitly)
prone  to  rescue  nations  in  economic  troubles.  In  fact,
the  abandonment  of  the  Eurozone  by  some  countries  can
destabilize  other  European  economies  and,  eventually,
lead  to  the  Euro  breakup.  This  matter  of  fact  can  be  (or
can  have  been)  at  the  origin  of  moral  hazard  episodes
by  member  countries  (The  trinomial  of  monetary  unions,
moral  hazard  and  ‘too  big  to  fail’  diagnosis  (Section  2.8));
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•  it  is  no  mystery  that  monetary  unions  aim  at  neutralizing
exchange  risk  between  adherent  countries.  Nonetheless,
infra-union  devaluation  and  appreciation  risks  have  been
bartered  for  greater  exposure  to  sovereign  default  risks,
which  are  potentially  more  prejudicial  (The  bad  deal  of
bartering  exchange  rate  risks  for  sovereign  risks  (Section
2.9)).
As  the  reader  will  easily  grasp,  the  European  political  and
social  project,  which  is  a  great  ideal  and  should  be  therefore
protected  from  negative  inﬂuence,  is  nowadays  threatened
by  several  structural  factors  of  crisis  and  uncertainty.  Uni-
versally  known,  currency  unions  are  ‘the’  super-ﬁx  currency
regime  par  excellence  and,  precisely  as  such,  involve  some
essential  caveats,  which  are  mainly  a  direct  consequence
of  what  has  been  notoriously  called  ‘optimum  currency
area’  (Mundell,  1961).  Although  there  has  been  no  general
consensus  on  EMU’s  fulﬁllment  of  this  requirement,  it  is
incontestable  that  the  Euro  Area  has  been  subject  to  asym-
metric  shocks  and  shows  a  pronounced  tendency  toward
wide  spreading  imbalances.  If  we  add  to  it  that  this  par-
ticular  type  of  currency  union  has  been  ‘tweaked’  through
intrinsically  restrictive  prescriptions  like  the  (totally  unjus-
tiﬁed)  need  for  near-zero  public  deﬁcits  (cf.  the  Treaty  on
Stability,  Coordination  and  Governance  in  the  Economic  and
Monetary  Union  alias  Fiscal  Compact),  this  mix  of  elements
becomes  very  detrimental  to  the  stability  of  the  Eurozone
itself!  Claiming  that  ‘‘the  Euro  is  much,  much  more  than
a  currency.  The  Euro  is  the  guarantee  of  a  united  Europe.
If  the  Euro  fails,  then  Europe  fails.’’  (Merkel,  2011  (own
translation))  sounds  perhaps  emphatic,  but  is  for  sure  very
risky.  In  fact,  the  Euro  should  be  treated  as  ancillary  to
the  European  project  itself,  which  is  by  far  more  ambitious
and  system-relevant  than  its  artiﬁcial  currency.  Therefore,
national  as  well  as  communitarian  policymakers  should  be
particularly  concerned  with  defending  the  European  vision
l
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Table  1  Change  in  nominal  long-term  interest  rates  in  the  Euro  A
2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  
Austria  4.96  4.14  4.13  3.39  3.8  
Belgium 4.99  4.18  4.15  3.43  3.81  
Cyprus --  --  --  --  --  
Estonia --  --  --  --  --  
Finland 4.98  4.13  4.11  3.35  3.78  
France 4.86  4.13  4.1  3.41  3.8  
Germany 4.78  4.07  4.04  3.35  3.76  
Greece 5.12  4.27  4.26  3.59  4.07  
Ireland 5.01  4.13  4.08  3.33  3.76  
Italy 5.03  4.25  4.26  3.56  4.05  
Luxembourg  4.7  3.32  2.84  2.41  3.3  
Malta --  --  --  --  --  
Netherlands  4.89  4.12  4.1  3.37  3.78  
Portugal 5.01  4.18  4.14  3.44  3.91  
Slovakia --  --  --  --  --  
Slovenia -- --  --  --  --  
Spain 4.96  4.12  4.1  3.39  3.78  
Average 4.94  4.09  4.03  3.34  3.8  
Source: European Commission (2012e).tening  the  EMU  89
ithout  necessarily  linking  it  to  the  failures  and  successes
f  the  Euro.
.  The logical-analytical determination of the
original  sins’ of the Euro Area
n  order  to  analyze  the  previous  assertions,  it  is  particu-
arly  useful  to  combine  logical-analytical  ﬁndings  on  how
onetary  unions  work  with  some  statistical  data  aiming  at
orroborating  the  main  negative  trends  caused  by  monetary
niﬁcation.  Of  course,  the  paper’s  focus  will  be  on  the  Euro
rea  case,  which  is  not  only  the  best  example  of  modern
large)  currency  unions,  but  also  needs  to  be  urgently  deep-
ned  to  prevent  the  enduring  economic  escalation  in  the
urozone.
.1.  Anomalous  cyclical  exposure  to  the  inﬂuence
f good  and  bad  times
e  will  soon  prove  that  one  main  characteristic  of  the  Euro-
ean  Monetary  Union  is  its  intrinsic  inhomogeneity,  which
eads  in  turn  to  great  concerns  with  regard  to  its  durabil-
ty.  In  the  light  of  this  matter  of  fact,  it  is  pretty  obvious
o  claim  that  infra-national  discrepancies  are  reﬂected  by
ifferent  economic  performances  (Table  1).  Since  mem-
er  countries  of  the  Euro  Area  have  been  exposed  to
issimilar  economic  dynamics,  it  is  also  evident  that  (much-
eared)  asymmetric  shocks  are  likely  to  occur  even  in  the
uture  (‘‘The  Eurozone  may  be  prone  to  suffer  from  rotat-
ng  slumps  by  its  design.  But  ill-timed  asymmetric  shocks
ave  made  matters  worse.  [.  . .] If  there  is  one  major
esson  from  this  sorry  tale  of  macroeconomic  instability
ithin  the  Eurozone,  it  is  this:  the  architecture  of  the
MU  lacks  an  effective  macroeconomic  stabilization  mech-
nism  that  would  control  divergence  and  limit  the  size
rea.
2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  Change
4.3  4.36  3.94  3.23  3.32  −1.64
4.33  4.42  3.9  3.46  4.23  −0.76
--  4.6  4.6  4.6  5.79  1.19
--  --  --  --  --  --
4.29  4.29  3.74  3.01  3.01  −1.97
4.3  4.23  3.65  3.12  3.32  −1.54
4.22  3.98  3.22  2.74  2.61  −2.17
4.5  4.8  5.17  9.09  15.75  10.63
4.31  4.53  5.23  5.74  9.6  4.59
4.49  4.68  4.31  4.04  5.42  0.39
4.46  4.61  4.23  3.17  2.92  −1.78
--  4.81  4.54  4.19  4.49  −0.32
4.29  4.23  3.69  2.99  2.99  −1.90
4.42  4.52  4.21  5.4  10.24  5.23
--  --  4.71  3.87  4.45  −0.26
4.53  4.61  4.38  3.83  4.97  0.44
4.31  4.37  3.98  4.25  5.44  0.48
4.37  4.47  4.22  4.17  5.53  0.66
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f  cyclical  ﬂuctuations  for  the  individual  member  states’’
Landmann,  2011)).  More  precisely,  currency  unions  show  a
ronounced  tendency  to  conceal  economic  difﬁculties  expe-
ienced  by  their  members  in  periods  of  good  conjuncture  and
o  exacerbate  elements  of  weakness  in  times  of  economic
roubles.
In  this  speciﬁc  regard,  renowned  economists  have  repeat-
dly  and  presciently  claimed  that  ‘‘signiﬁcant  regional
roblems  will  continue  to  arise  after  the  elimination  of
tatutory  barriers  to  labor  and  commodity  movements  across
ational  borders.  Reﬂationary  initiatives  by  the  depressed
egions  will  be  limited  by  the  external  constraint.  Even  in
 currency  union,  Member  States  will  face  sharply  rising
osts  of  debt  ﬁnancing,  Governments  which  nevertheless
un  budget  deﬁcits  will  deplete  their  reserves  and  run  up
gainst  the  external  constraint’’  (Eichengreen  et  al.,  1990).
ot  surprisingly,  this  is  precisely  what  is  nowadays  going  on
n  the  Eurozone.  For  instance,  let  us  analyze  some  main
rends  in  long-term  interest  rates,  which  somehow  repre-
ent  investors’  and  savers’  conﬁdence  in  the  stability  of  the
ational  economy  as  a  whole.  In  this  speciﬁc  regard,  Table  1
learly  shows  that  EMU  member  countries  have  experienced
ears  of  (at  least,  perceived)  trustfulness  characterized  by
eavy  drops  in  borrowing  costs,  but,  as  soon  as  the  debt  crisis
roke  out,  long-term  interest  rates  began  growing  steadily
nd  reaching  anomalously  high  levels  in  European  countries
n  economic  difﬁculties  (e.g.  Greece,  Ireland,  Portugal)  as
ell  as  unprecedentedly  low  levels  in  ‘virtuous’  nations  (e.g.
ustria,  Finland,  Germany,  Luxembourg,  Netherlands).  Why
s  it  so?  Since  the  European  Monetary  Union  is  plagued  by
evere  dissimilarities  in  economic  terms  and  ﬁnancial  mar-
ets  are  not  prone  (or  ready)  to  suddenly  disinvest  from  the
uro  Area  as  a  whole,  economically  trustful  countries  gain
ven  more  attractiveness,  while  weaker  member  nations
a
T
d
Table  2  Determination  procedure  of  a  common  nominal  long-ter
Contribution  to  EMU’s  ye
decimal  numbers)
Austria  0.032  
Belgium 0.039  
Cyprus 0.002  
Estonia 0.002  
Finland 0.020  
France 0.212  
Germany 0.273  
Greece 0.023  
Ireland 0.017  
Italy 0.168  
Luxembourg  0.005  
Malta 0.001  
Netherlands  0.064  
Portugal 0.018  
Slovakia 0.007  
Slovenia 0.004  
Spain 0.114  
Sum 1  
New common  interest  rate  (iEMU)  4.30%
Source: European Commission (2012e).E.  Beretta
egatively  attract  the  attention  of  the  ﬁnancial  commu-
ity.  More  precisely,  ‘‘after  the  creation  of  the  euro,  large
apital  ﬂows  started  to  ﬂy  from  core  Eurozone  countries
nto  the  periphery.  The  peripheral  Eurozone  economies
mainly  Greece,  Ireland  and  Spain)  in  their  catching-up
hase  appeared  to  core  European  member  states  with  large
avings  and  little  domestic  investment  prospects  as  a  great
nvestment  opportunity.  [.  .  .] In  this  sense  capital  ﬂows  (and
everage)  were  the  ‘ﬁnancial  manifestation’  of  the  macro-
conomic  imbalances.  When  the  ﬁnancial  crisis  broke  in  late
007,  the  risk  perception  changed  dramatically  and  resulted
n  a  sudden  stop  of  private  capital  ﬂows’’  (Gros  and  Alcidi,
011).  Obviously  enough,  these  elements  of  irregular  (and
symmetric)  exposure  to  good  as  well  as  bad  conjuncture
ould  not  exist,  if  there  would  be  common  long-term  inter-
st  rates  for  the  Eurozone  in  its  entirety  (iEMU)  resulting  for
nstance  from  weighing  the  interest  values  of  each  member
ountry  (iAustria+·  ·  ·+iSpain)  by  its  percentage  contribution  to
urozone’s  yearly  GDP  (pAustria+·  ·  ·+pSpain):
EMU = iAustria(pAustria)  +  ·  ·  ·  +  iSpain(pSpain)∑(pAustria +  ·  ·  · +  pSpain
here  εpAustria+·  ·  ·+pSpain is  necessarily  equal  to  1  being  the
um  of  all  national  weights.  Therefore,  the  formula  above
an  be  transformed  into  the  following  expression:
EMU =  iAustria(pAustria) +  ·  · ·  +  iSpain(pSpain)As  Table  2  shows,  the  long-term  interest  rate  valid  for
ll  EMU  member  countries  would  be  then  equal  to  4.3%.
his  (symbolic)  result  derives  from  the  calculation  proce-
ure  based  on  2011  data.
m  interest  rate.
arly  GDP  (in Weighted  interest  rate’s  contribution
to  iEMU
0.001
0.002
0.000
0.000
0.001
0.007
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Of  course,  we  are  well  conscious  that  each  country
presents  several  as  well  as  different  interest  rates.  Any-
way,  this  matter  of  fact  is  not  (necessarily)  an  impediment,
because  we  consider  either  the  average  interest  rates  or
simply  long-term  data.  After  that,  since  the  latter  hypo-
thetical  scenario  assumes  that  national  long-term  interest
rates  should  be  replaced  with  a  common  value  (iEMU)  namely
in  this  case  4.3%,  it  is  also  pretty  clear  that  after  time  0
(t0),  which  is  represented  by  the  year  2011  in  our  example,
policy  makers  would  not  have  any  new  data  on  national  long-
term  interest  rates  in  order  to  calculate  the  new  common
interest  value  (iEMU)  as  weighted  measure.  Nevertheless,  this
would  not  be  a  signiﬁcant  obstacle  to  our  proposal,  since  iEMU
would  be  then  determined  by  demand  and  supply  on  ﬁnan-
cial  markets.  The  value  of  4.30%  at  time  0  (t0)  would  remain
a  valid  indicator  for  increasing  (iEMU <  4.30%)  or  shrinking
(iEMU >  4.30%)  (borrowing)  reputation  of  the  Eurozone  in  its
entirety  as  compared  to  year  0  (t0).  In  this  speciﬁc  regard,
we  are  pretty  sure  that  EMU’s  common  interest  rate  would
be  signiﬁcantly  below  the  threshold  of  4.30%,  which  is  man-
ifestly  overestimated  as  compared  to  leading  economies
worldwide.  Obviously  enough,  it  is  very  likely  that  the  pos-
itive  inﬂuence  of  ‘virtuous’  countries  like  Austria,  Finland,
Germany,  Luxembourg  and  the  Netherlands  would  overweigh
in  the  determination  process  of  iEMU on  ﬁnancial  markets.
In  fact,  a  similar  phenomenon  also  occurs  in  the  case
of  Japan,  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  United  States  of
America,  whose  economic  uncertainties  somehow  seem  to
be  considered  harmless  by  international  investors  (Table  3).
This  matter  of  fact  is  not  astonishing,  because  ﬁnancial  mar-
kets  evaluate  the  stability  of  economic  subjects  as  a  whole.
In  this  speciﬁc  regard,  speculators  as  well  as  investors
require  (excessively)  high  interest  rates  from  single  EMU
member  countries,  but  they  would  not  request  similarly
high  earnings  from  the  European  Monetary  Union  (EMU)  in
its  entirety.  As  empirical  evidence  proves,  downgrading  in
ratings,  which  often  occurs  only  after  the  bursting  of  the
crisis  itself  (Reinhart,  2002),  has  affected  single  countries
including  France,  Greece,  Italy,  etc.  The  European  Finan-
cial  Stability  Facility  (EFSF)  has  also  lost  its  top-rating,  but
only  as  a  consequence  of  the  fact  that  its  leading  member
countries  have  been  previously  downgraded.  Since  Euro-
zone’s  credibility  assessment  results  nowadays  from  the
sum  of  national  reputation  levels,  it  is  not  unlikely  that
the  European  Stability  Mechanism  (ESM)  will  be  declassiﬁed
too.  Precisely  this  detrimental  trend  characterized  by  scarce
trustfulness  of  some  member  countries  spreading  over  to  the
European  Monetary  Union  (EMU)  as  a  whole  should  belong
to  the  past.  In  fact,  Japan’s,  United  Kingdom’s  or  United
States’  ratings  (and  long-term  interest  rates)  are  for  sure
t
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Table  3  Change  in  nominal  long-term  interest  rates  in  key-curre
2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  
Japan  1.27  0.99  1.5  1.39  1.74  
United Kingdom  4.91  4.58  4.93  4.46  4.37  
USA 4.6  4  4.26  4.28  4.79  
Average 3.59  3.19  3.56  3.38  3.63  
Source: European Commission (2012e).tening  the  EMU  91
ot  inﬂuenced  by  the  state  of  health  of  single  regions  or
ederal  States,  but  correspond  to  the  general  assessment
f  country’s  creditworthiness.  Evidently,  this  different  eval-
ation  approach  leads  to  signiﬁcantly  lower  interest  rates
Table  3).  Unless  the  Eurozone  will  represent  a  sole  eco-
omic  nation  in  the  eyes  of  ﬁnancial  markets,  every  single
atter  of  concern  at  the  national  level  will  be  considered
evere  enough  to  endanger  EMU’s  survivability!
.2.  Communication  challenges  and  univocity
t  is  no  scientiﬁc  discovery  to  claim  that  ‘‘over  the  last
wo  decades,  communication  has  become  an  increasingly
mportant  aspect  of  monetary  policy.  The  evidence  sug-
ests  that  communication  can  be  an  important  and  powerful
art  of  the  central  bank’s  toolkit  since  it  has  the  ability
o  move  ﬁnancial  markets,  to  enhance  the  predictabil-
ty  of  monetary  policy  decisions,  and  potentially  to  help
chieve  central  banks’  macroeconomic  objectives’’  (Blinder
t  al.,  2008).  Therefore,  economists  and  ﬁnancial  analysts
re  actively  involved  in  evaluating  central  banks’  commu-
ication  strategies  and  their  effectiveness.  In  this  speciﬁc
egard,  it  already  belongs  to  common  knowledge  that  the
uropean  Central  Bank  (ECB)  is  considered  to  be  more  trans-
arent  than  the  Federal  Reserve  although  relatively  less  than
he  Bank  of  England,  the  Reserve  Bank  of  New  Zealand  and
he  Bank  of  Canada  (Eijfﬁnger  and  Geraats,  2006).  Nonethe-
ess,  some  essential  caveats  should  be  also  mentioned  in
rder  to  distinguish  between  de  iure  (i.e.  declared)  and  de
acto  (i.e.  practical)  transparency:  ‘‘[o]n  the  basis  of  the
reaty’s  requirements,  one  would  think  that  the  ECB  is  more
ccountable  than  most  other  central  banks.  [.  .  .] In  its  early
perations,  however,  the  ECB  has  shown  less  accountabil-
ty  than  one  would  have  expected’’  (Bini  Smaghi  and  Gros,
000).  Despite  this  new  research  stream,  economists  still
eem  to  be  unaware  of  the  relevance  of  the  question  on
ow  can  communication  be  successfully  managed  in  mone-
ary  unions.  In  fact,  it  would  be  simply  unrealistic  to  focus
n  the  ECB  as  the  only  speaking  voice  in  the  Eurozone!
s  daily  evidence  has  proven,  announcements  by  repre-
entatives  of  the  European  Central  Banks  have  been  often
nough  contradicted  by  politicians  of  member  countries.
bviously,  confusion  and  distrust  in  ECB’s  policy  effective-
ess  has  become  increasingly  diffuse  leading  to  (even  more)
nstability  in  ﬁnancial  markets.  For  instance,  it  is  no  mystery
hat  ECB  President  Mario  Draghi  has  been  openly  criticized  by
undesbank  President  Jens  Weidmann.  For  sure,  this  ongo-
ng  situation  does  not  clarify  if  interventions  to  rescue  the
ommon  currency  will  be  actually  supported  by  the  most
ncy  countries.
2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  Change
1.68  1.49  1.35  1.18  1.12  −0.15
5.06  4.5  3.36  3.36  3.05  −1.86
4.63  3.65  3.25  3.2  2.76  −1.84
3.79  3.21  2.65  2.58  2.31  −1.28
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nﬂuential  shareholders  of  the  ECB.  Thanks  to  its  Euro  1.72
n.  corresponding  to  18.94  per  cent  of  paid-up  capital,  the
eutsche  Bundesbank  is  thus  the  main  contributor  to  ECB’s
apital  (European  Central  Bank,  2012a).
As  wide  spreading  yield  differentials  in  the  Euro  Area
how,  ﬁnancial  markets  have  proven  to  be  rather  skeptical
oward  European  recovery,  which  is  seriously  endangered  by
he  missing  degree  of  univocity  in  determining  who  has  to
ace  investors,  savers  and  speculators  through  the  press  and
ho  has  to  say  what  or,  as  stated  by  the  former  President  of
he  European  Central  Bank  Jean-Claude  Trichet,  to  improve
‘verbal  discipline’’  (European  Parliament,  2010).
In  this  speciﬁc  regard,  economic  analysis  shows  that
‘creating  a  single  voice  for  the  euro  is  a  perilous  politi-
al  endeavor,  which  explains  why  member  states  have  so
ar  avoided  the  issue.  Deciding  who  will  speak  on  behalf
f  the  euro  in  international  monetary  fora  raises  a host
f  critical  questions’’  (McNamara  and  Meunier,  2002).  Of
ourse,  the  immediate  consequences  of  this  detrimental
ay  of  managing  communication  do  not  enhance  credibil-
ty  and  conﬁdence  in  the  European  Central  Bank  (ECB),
lthough  good  reputation  is  one  of  the  most  signiﬁcant
spects  of  monetary  policy.  In  the  contrary,  the  European
onetary  Union  lacks  diffuse  convergence  of  opinions,  which
n  turn  leads  to  incessant  inner  diatribes  on  monetary  strat-
gy  (Deutsche  Bundesbank,  2012a,  b),  which  weakens  the
mpact  of  ECB’s  anti-cyclical  interventions.  For  sure,  the
eformed  Euro  Area  urgently  needs  to  (re)deﬁne  infra-
nion  communication  mechanisms,  because  they  are  one
f  many  key-elements  necessary  to  strengthen  Europe’s
redibility  in  tackling  the  ongoing  crisis.  In  fact,  although
arge  currency  unions  made  of  17  member  countries  are
ot  easily  manageable  as  empirical  evidence  shows,  this
hallenge  cannot  be  circumvented!  Visibly  enough,  it  sub-
ists  a  clear  logical  chain  between  bad  and/or  contradictory
e.g.  non-univocal)  communication  and  panic-like  symp-
oms  in  ﬁnancial  markets.  As  recent  publications  have
roven,  ‘‘public  statements  by  Euro  Area  politicians  on
estructuring  increased  market  pressure,  resulting  in  higher
ond  spreads  and  higher  conditional  volatility,  in  par-
icular  when  issued  by  a  politician  from  an  AAA-rated
ountry’’  (Mohl  and  Sondermann,  2012)  and  ‘‘[t]he  mere
hetoric  of  relevant  politicians  increases  the  uncertainty
f  ﬁnancial  markets  considerably’’  (Goldbach  and  Fahrholz,
010).
Although  this  reform  proposal  could  appear  less  struc-
ural  than  subjects  for  debate  like  ‘banking  union’  or  ‘ﬁscal
nion’,  it  is  deﬁnitely  not  less  relevant.  Once  again,  the
uropean  Monetary  Union  is  in  need  of  stability,  which  has
o  be  also  (re)introduced  through  the  medium  of  proper
ommunication,  i.e.  an  essential  tool  at  central  banks’  dis-
osal  in  an  era  of  global  interconnectedness.
.3.  The  permanent  menace  of  reversibility
ecently,  the  President  of  the  European  Central  Bank  (ECB)
imself  has  claimed  that  Euro’s  ‘‘irreversibility  means  that
t  cannot  be  reversed.  There  is  no  going  back  to  the  Lira
r  the  Drachma  or  to  any  other  currency.  It  is  pointless  to
et  against  the  euro.  It  is  pointless  to  go  short  on  the  euro.
hat  was  the  message.  It  is  pointless  because  the  euro  will
r
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tay  and  it  is  irreversible’’  (Draghi,  2012b) and  that  ‘‘we  will
o  whatever  it  takes  within  our  mandate  --  within  our  man-
ate  --  to  have  a  single  monetary  policy  in  the  Euro  Area,  to
aintain  price  stability  in  the  Euro  Area  and  to  preserve  the
uro.  And  we  say  that  the  euro  is  irreversible.  So  unfounded
ears  of  reversibility  are  just  what  they  are:  unfounded
ears’’  (Draghi,  2012c).  Now,  it  is  pretty  evident  that  central
ankers’  announcements  must  be  clear,  fearless  and  deter-
ined  enough  to  inspire  conﬁdence  (‘‘I  am  communicating
his  message  as  the  President  of  the  ECB  to  all  stakeholders,
itizens,  businesses  and  markets.  Investors  need  a  long-term
ision  because  they  undertake  long-term  commitments.  For
hem,  it  is  very  important  that  our  leaders  and  governments
re  determined  to  keep  the  euro  irreversible.  So,  if  I  say  this,
 am  saying  what  our  political  leaders  are  fundamentally  say-
ng.  Again,  I  am  saying  it  because  it  is  important  to  do  so.
arkets  should  know  that  the  euro  is  irreversible.  That  helps
hem  to  properly  price  Euro  Area  assets  and  it  helps  us  in  the
onduct  of  our  monetary  policy’’  (Draghi,  2012a)).  But  is  the
uro  as  common  currency  really  irreversible?  Despite  many
ssurances,  it  is  reversible  indeed!
But  why  is  it  so?  Of  course,  because  of  the  intrinsic
ssence  of  every  exchange  rate  arrangement.  In  fact,  cur-
ency  unions  are  nothing  else  than  more  or  less  ﬂexible
egimes  (f.i.  pure  ﬂoat,  managed  ﬂoat,  crawling  band,
rawling  peg,  peg  with  horizontal  band)  or  ﬁx  exchange
ate  agreements  (f.i.  ﬁxed  peg,  currency  board,  dollariza-
ion/eurozation,  monetary  union).  Obviously  enough,  the
uropean  Monetary  Union  is  subject  to  ‘the’  super-ﬁx  cur-
ency  standard  par  excellence,  but  this  matter  of  fact  does
or  sure  not  prevent  the  Euro  currency  from  being  reversible.
or  instance,  economic  history  tells  us  that  there  have  been
everal  examples  of  comparable  currency  unions,  which
ave  strenuously  battled  against  inner  economic  problems
nd  systematically  failed.  There  is  in  this  regard  no  doubt
hat  the  Euro  Area  is  the  most  interesting  case  in  time,  but
his  conclusion  does  not  prevent  it  from  being  exposed  to  the
ame  difﬁculties  or  to  even  more  economic  troubles.  Why  is
t  so?  Obviously  enough,  because  ‘‘individual  partners  lose
he  capacity  derived  from  an  exclusive  national  currency
o  augment  public  spending  at  will  via  money  creation  --  a
rivilege  known  as  seigniorage.  Technically  deﬁned  as  the
xcess  of  the  nominal  value  of  a currency  over  its  cost  of
roduction,  seigniorage  can  be  understood  as  an  alternative
ource  of  revenue  for  the  State  beyond  what  can  be  raised
y  taxes  or  by  borrowing  from  ﬁnancial  markets.  Sacriﬁce
f  the  seigniorage  privilege  must  also  be  compared  against
 monetary  union’s  efﬁciency  gains’’  (Cohen,  2010).  Hence,
e  draw  two  main  conclusions:  on  the  one  hand,  seignior-
ge,  which  represents  one  of  the  leading  monetary  tools  of
entral  banks  like  the  Federal  Reserve  or  the  Bank  of  Japan,
as  been  given  up  and  States  have  to  collect  enough  taxes
r  borrow  from  ﬁnancial  markets  in  order  to  comply  with
heir  ﬁnancial  requirements.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  ﬁrst
cenario  goes  hand  in  hand  with  an  increasingly  higher  ﬁs-
al  burden,  while  in  the  second  case  public  administrations
xpose  themselves  to  ﬂuctuating  moods,  fears  and  feelings
f  investors  as  well  as  speculators.  On  the  other  hand,  cur-
ency  unions  present  some  main  beneﬁts,  which  are  mostly
elated  to  shrinking  transaction  costs  because  of  the  absence
f  intra-union  exchange  rates.  Although  we  truly  believe
hat  under  these  conditions  cons  outweigh  pros,  this  last
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assertion  will  not  be  further  deepened  (or,  at  least,  not  in
this  paper).
What  remains  profoundly  veridical  is  that  no  currency
arrangement  is  irreversible,  although  it  is  quite  sure  that
breaking  up  the  Euro  and  reintroducing  national  currencies
would  be  very  costly!  In  somebody’s  eyes,  this  is  maybe  a
good  argument  for  Euro’s  alleged  irreversibility. .  .. As  empir-
ical  evidence  has  shown,  ﬁnancial  markets  are  perfectly
aware  of  Euro’s  reversibility,  which  hangs  over  its  destiny
as  a  Sword  of  Damocles.  For  sure,  there  can  be  no  skepti-
cism  on  the  reversibility  fears  of  the  Eurozone  subsisting  in
the  business  as  well  as  ﬁnancial  sectors,  which  has  explicitly
analyzed  the  disruptive  consequences  of  such  a  breakup  and
has  also  published  speciﬁc  guides  to  brace  investors  for  the
worst  scenario  (Accenture,  2011;  Dun  &  Bradstreet  Limited,
2012).  In  fact,  national  currencies  as  the  US  Dollar,  Japanese
Yen  or  the  former  European  currencies  were  not  reversible  to
anything,  because  they  were  naturally  given  currencies,  i.e.
they  were  imaginarily  placed  at  time  0  (t0)  on  the  timeline
of  national  monetary  history.  In  other  words,  even  in  case
of  sharp  depreciation,  the  Italian  Lira  would  have  remained
the  Italian  Lira.  On  the  contrary,  the  Euro  is  an  artiﬁcial
currency,  which  is  placed  at  time  1  (t1)  on  the  timeline  of
monetary  history.  This  apparently  subtle  distinction  is  very
signiﬁcant,  because  it  represents  an  unprecedented  matter
of  concern  for  investors  worldwide.  In  fact,  in  addition  to
depreciation/appreciation  assumptions  already  attached  to
national  currencies,  ﬁnancial  markets  (may)  fear  the  disin-
tegration  of  the  currency  itself.  Evidently  enough,  this  is
a  completely  new  (and  extraordinarily  perilous)  dimension!
In  fact,  ‘‘although  the  analysis  of  potentially  destabilizing
inﬂuences  has  received  a  greater  attention  in  recent  years,
contributions  in  this  area  have  typically  been  conﬁned  to
the  transition  phase  preceding  the  formal  establishment  of  a
currency  union.  The  issue  of  its  long  run  sustainability,  on  the
other  hand,  has  so  far  received  a  surprisingly  scant  atten-
tion;  in  other  words,  once  a  currency  union  is  established,
this  regime  shift  is  usually  regarded  as  a  strictly  irreversible
process.  Treating  the  introduction  of  a  common  currency  as
an  irrevocable  choice  is  a  relevant  shortcoming  in  the  exist-
ing  theoretical  literature.  The  above  assumption,  moreover,
stands  in  sharp  contrast  with  the  historical  record  of  the
last  two  centuries.  As  revealed  by  the  empirical  evidence,
the  actual  experience  of  currency  unions  has  indeed  been
remarkably  mixed:  while  some  of  them  were  highly  success-
ful,  others  ultimately  proved  unsustainable’’  (Menoncin  and
Tronzano,  2005).
For  sure,  we  do  not  even  need  to  analyze  each  case  of
monetary  unions’  breakup:  the  Austro-German  (1857--1866),
Latin  (1865--1927)  and  Scandinavian  (1873--1931)  currency
unions  are  probably  sufﬁcient  to  prove  the  reversibility  of
every  exchange  rate  arrangement.  Now,  the  fact  that  the
Euro  currency  can  be  intrinsically  reversed  and  member
countries  in  trouble  may  exit  as  last  resort  results  in  sudden
conﬁdence  crises  during  economic  turmoil  and  anomalously
high  propensity  of  investors  to  bet  against  Euro’s  durability
(Apray,  2011).  At  the  back  of  their  minds,  ﬁnancial  markets
are  well  conscious  of  the  risk  of  reversibility,  which  keeps
menacing  the  recovery  as  well  as  Euro’s  daily  routine.  Not
enough,  these  apprehensions  are  continuously  nurtured  by
incautious  statements  by  European  representatives  like  the
EU  Economic  and  Monetary  Affairs  Commissioner  Olli  Rehn,
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ho  is  worried  about  the  potential  ‘‘disintegration  of  the
urozone’’  (Rehn,  2012),  or  by  the  Vice  President  of  the
uropean  Commission  Joaquìn  Almunia,  who  merely  claims
hat  Greece’s  ‘‘exit  would  be  a  tragedy,  and  not  only  for
reece’’  (Almunia,  2011).  These  assertions  not  only  validate
he  ‘roped  party  effect’,  which  will  be  duly  explained  in  the
ext  sections,  but  it  also  does  not  deny  (or  even  exclude)
hat  member  countries  may  leave  the  Eurozone  --  in  fact,
o  (currency)  agreement  can  prevent  one  party  from  not
ulﬁlling  it,  does  not  it?  The  Euro  currency  has  been  (at
east,  tacitly)  reversible  starting  from  its  very  introduction,
ut  the  common  money  unit  has  maybe  become  more  pre-
arious  after  unclear  statements,  uncoordinated  disclaimers
nd,  more  generally,  bad  crisis  management.
.4.  The  roped  party  effect  of  common  currencies
hat  we  call  ‘roped  party  effect  of  common  currencies’  rep-
esents  nothing  else  than  an  intuitive  conclusion,  which  is
irectly  interrelated  with  the  founding  principles  of  mone-
ary  unions.  In  fact,  currency  unions  are  mostly  described
ith  the  British  idiomatic  expression  ‘United  we  stand,
ivided  we  fall’.  But  is  it  really  true  that  the  European  Mone-
ary  Union  has  become  more  vigorous  after  having  let  in  new
ember  countries,  which  are  characterized  by  pretty  diver-
ent  economic  fundamentals?  Probably  not!  For  sure,  the
diomatic  phrase  mentioned  above  does  not  apply  to  mon-
tary  unions  and  should  be  therefore  turned  into  ‘United
e  stand,  united  we  fall’. .  .. In  other  words,  if  one  member
ountry  is  afﬂicted  by  a  severe  crisis  and  fears  on  the  sus-
ainability  of  the  currency  arrangement  itself  arise,  ﬁnancial
arkets  will  be  induced  to  stand  in  awe  of  the  system’s  dura-
ility  and  will  not  be  prevented  from  assuming  the  worst
ase,  namely  the  breakup  of  the  currency  union.  In  addi-
ion,  ‘‘a  ﬁnal  factor  that  is  hindering  an  increased  global
ole  for  the  euro  is  the  continued  hesitation  on  the  part  of
uro-zone  countries  themselves  to  embrace  their  newly  cre-
ted  currency.  Leaders  of  a  number  of  euro-zone  countries
ncluding  Germany,  France,  and  Italy  have  at  one  time  or
nother  hinted  that  an  exit  strategy  might  be  needed  under
ertain  economic  conditions.  Even  if  these  murmurings  are
ntended  only  for  internal  political  consumption,  they  leave
he  rest  of  the  world  with  a  nagging  sense  of  doubt  about  the
ongevity  of  Euroland.  But  doubts  about  the  wisdom  of  eco-
omic  and  monetary  integration  persist  across  Europe.  This
ariness  also  inﬂuences  the  ability  of  the  European  Central
ank  to  take  over  monetary  policy  efﬁciently  and  limits  the
bility  of  the  euro  to  become  a  true  rival  of  the  dollar  in
lobal  ﬁnancial  markets’’  (Dominguez,  2006).  But  why  is  it
o?  Logically,  because  of  the  ﬁndings  explained  in  Section
.7  and  the  reduced  degree  of  unanimity  in  decision  mak-
ng:  in  fact,  this  is  the  same  principle  observable  for  married
ouples  where  choices  have  to  be  (mostly,  at  least)  made
n  consultation.  Single  people  can  be  therefore  more  com-
itted  to  their  decisions  than  couples,  who  have  to  come
o  an  agreement.  In  the  light  of  these  arguments,  it  seems
retty  likely  that  ﬁnancial  markets  as  well  as  politicians  fear
he  consequence  of  any  ‘domino  effect’  originating  from  the
xit  or  ﬁnancial  collapse  of  Greece  or,  even  more,  Italy  and
pain.  If  common  currencies  would  not  be  subject  to  this
roped  party  effect’  as  we  claim  to  be,  there  would  be  no
9 E.  Beretta
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Table  4  Change  in  unemployment  rates  in  the  Euro  Area.
First  year  after
adhesion  to  EMU
2011  Change
Austria  4.2  4.2  0
Belgium  7.5  7.2  −0.3
Cyprus 3.7  (2008)  7.8  4.1
Estonia 12.5  (2011)  0
Finland  9.1  7.8  −1.3
France 8.3  9.7  1.4
Germany  8.7  5.9  −2.8
Greece  10.3  17.7  7.4
Ireland 4.5  14.4  9.9
Italy 8.5  8.4  −0.1
Luxembourg  2.6  4.8  2.2
Malta 6  (2008)  6.5  0.5
Netherlands  3.1  4.4  1.3
Portugal  5.7  12.9  7.2
Slovakia  9.5  (2009)  13.5  4
Slovenia  4.9  (2007)  8.2  3.3
Spain 11.4  21.7  10.3
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lausible  reason  for  fearing  cascade  effects  from  Southern
uropean  countries’  insolvency  and  claiming  that  the  Euro
urrency  itself  would  be  in  danger  because  of  Greece’s  exit.
In  times  of  economic  troubles  and  growing  ﬁnancial  insta-
ility,  common  currencies  have  to  rely  all  the  more  on
nfra-union  cohesion  as  well  as  sound  policies  taken  by
ther  member  countries.  As  easily  imaginable,  there  are
too)  many  unknown  quantities,  which  make  it  hard(er)
or  investors  and  savers  to  blindly  trust  17  different  EMU
ations.  In  addition,  if  rating  agencies  are  actively  involved
n  revoking  triple  AAAs  and,  by  doing  so,  they  literally  split
uro  Area  members  into  ‘good’  and  ‘bad’  ones,  unregulated
nancial  markets  will  have  an  additional,  all-embracing  rea-
on  for  distrust.  In  keeping  therefore  with  the  motto,  ‘united
e  stand,  united  we  fall’. .  ..
.5.  One  size  does  not  ﬁt  all!/If  it  does  not  ﬁt,  use
 bigger  hammer!  Or  not?
n  additional  element  of  structural  weakness  is  the  Euro’s
nnate  ‘one-size-ﬁts-all  approach’.  It  is  no  mystery  that  the
uropean  Monetary  Union  formulates  a  single  economic  pol-
cy,  which  should  comply  with  the  speciﬁc  needs  of  each
ember  country.  In  actual  fact,  it  is  rather  utopistic  to  think
f  the  Eurozone  as  an  optimal  currency  area,  whose  mem-
er  nations  have  homogeneous  needs!  On  the  contrary,  as
asily  graspable,  EMU  is  characterized  by  several  aspects  of
iversity  ranging  from  economic  as  well  as  cultural  and  social
eculiarities.  In  the  light  of  this,  it  results  that  the  Eurozone
s  not  only  a  suboptimal  currency  area:  ‘‘the  EMU  by  contrast
s  a  dubious  candidate  for  an  optimal  currency  area  because
lthough  it  too  trades  intensively  within  the  region,  national
ork  restrictions  greatly  impair  intra-European  labor  mobil-
ty,  and  supranational  ﬁscal  power  is  feeble  because  rich
embers  don’t  want  to  assume  heavy  ﬁnancing  burdens
uring  turbulent  times.  [.  .  .] EMU  architecture  is  compara-
ively  economically  inefﬁcient,  bubble  prone  and  unusually
ubject  to  systemic  risk.  [.  .  .] A  greater  political  union  is
ey  to  the  preservation  of  the  European  monetary  union’’
Razin  and  Roseﬁelde,  2012).  Interestingly  enough,  empiri-
al  evidence  shows  that  even  three  (apparently,  very  similar)
candinavian  countries  like  Denmark,  Norway  and  Sweden
ave  not  constituted  any  optimal  currency  region  during
he  Scandinavian  Currency  Union  (Bergman,  1999).  Further-
ore,  the  Euro  Area  also  urgently  needs  to  take  advantage
rom  a  diversiﬁed  monetary  policy  mix,  which  cannot  be
nymore  supplied  by  national  Governments  (‘‘While  the
reaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  union  (TFEU)
nstitutes  a  single  monetary  policy,  it  maintains  national
esponsibilities  for  other  economic  (e.g.  ﬁscal  and  struc-
ural)  policies’’  (European  Central  Bank,  2011)).  Let  us  face
he  actual  situation  resulting  from  an  accurate  analysis
f  infra-communitarian  data.  For  instance,  unemployment
ates  are  dramatically  (but  for  sure  not  unpredictably)  diver-
ent  (Table  4).
In  fact,  ‘‘the  economic  consequences  of  EMU  are  also
ikely  to  be  negative.  Imposing  a  single  interest  rate  and
n  inﬂexible  exchange  rate  on  countries  that  are  charac-
erized  by  different  economic  shocks,  inﬂexible  wages,  low
abor  mobility  and  separate  national  ﬁscal  systems  with-
ut  signiﬁcant  cross-border  cyclical  transfers  will  raise  the
g
r
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dAverage 7.09  9.12  2.77
Source: European Commission (2012f).
verall  level  of  cyclical  unemployment  among  the  EMU  mem-
ers’’  (Feldstein,  1997).  More  generally  and  in  the  light  of
he  enduring  economic  crisis,  high  and  divergent  unemploy-
ent  rates  are  not  necessarily  a  consequence  of  European
entral  Bank’s  policy  interventions,  but  they  are  due  to
oundaries  drawn  by  participation  criteria  to  the  Euro  Area
‘‘[T]he  ECB  monetary  policy  is  systematically  biased  against
utput  stabilization  and  lacks  the  ﬂexibility  that  a  proper
nﬂation  targeting  strategy  has’’  (Rossi,  2004)).  As  a  matter
f  fact,  widening  economic  and  ﬁnancial  performances  by
ember  countries,  which  are  a  logical  effect  of  their  differ-
nt  competitive  potential,  are  forcibly  blowing  the  European
onetary  Union  to  pieces.  The  principle  we  are  writing  about
s  very  intuitive  and  can  be  compared  to  an  elastic  band,
hich  is  not  anymore  able  to  sustain  pressure  originating
rom  items  too  big  (and  too  different  in  form)  to  be  held
ogether.  As  soon  as  disaggregating  forces  become  unsus-
ainably  massive,  the  gum  band  tears  apart  and  every  object
eld  together  cuts  its  own  path  which  it  has  been  until  then
revented  from.
Even  inﬂation  rates,  which  should  be  relevant  in  the  light
f  ECB’s  focus  on  price  stability,  do  not  obey  monetary  poli-
ies.  Well  aware  of  this  fact,  ECB  President  Mario  Draghi
tates  that  ‘‘we  want  to  repair  monetary  policy  transmission
hannels  and  we  clearly  see  a  risk,  and  I  mean  the  convert-
bility  premium  in  some  interest  rates.  But  the  Governing
ouncil  knows  that  monetary  policy  would  not  be  enough
o  achieve  these  objectives  unless  there  is  also  action  by
he  governments.  If  there  are  substantial  and  continuing
isequilibria  and  imbalances  in  current  accounts,  in  ﬁscal
eﬁcits,  in  prices  and  in  competitiveness,  monetary  pol-
cy  cannot  ﬁll  this  vacuum  of  lack  of  action.  Action  by  the
overnments  at  the  Euro  Area  level  is  just  as  essential  for
epairing  monetary  policy  transmission  channels  as  is  appro-
riate  action  on  our  side’’  (Draghi,  2012b). In  fact,  high  and
ivergent  yields  on  Government  bonds  modify  the  impact
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Table  5  Change  in  the  Harmonized  Consumer  Price  Index
(HCPI).
First  year  after
adhesion  to  EMU
2011  Change
Austria  94.83  113.42  18.59
Belgium  94.32  115.27  20.95
Cyprus 109.03  (2008) 115.93  6.9
Estonia  133.40  (2011) 0
Finland  97.82  114.16  16.34
France  93.86  111.28  17.42
Germany  95.39  111.13  15.74
Greece  90.67  121.35  30.68
Ireland  91.98  106.63  14.65
Italy 93.05  113.77  20.72
Luxembourg  91.04  117.32  26.28
Malta 108.13  (2008)  115.1  6.97
Netherlands  95.05  110.23  15.18
Portugal  92.51  112.72  20.21
Slovakia  111.43  (2009)  116.79  5.36
Slovenia  106.39  (2007)  118.03  11.64
Spain 91.04  116.35  25.31
Average 99.41  115.46  16.06
Table  6  Change  in  GDP  growth  rates  among  member
countries.
First  year  after
adhesion  to  EMU
2011  Average
Austria  1.69  3.11  1.79
Belgium  1.36  1.92  1.52
Cyprus 3.63  (2008)  0.48  0.89
Estonia  7.64  (2011)  7.64
Finland 1.83  2.85  1.92
France 0.93  1.70  1.11
Germany  0.01  3.00  1.11
Greece 3.44  −6.91  1.07
Ireland  5.87  −0.7 1.93
Italy  0.45  0.43  0.25
Luxembourg  4.10  1.55  2.68
Malta 4.36  (2008)  2.1  1.63
Netherlands  0.08  1.17  1.31
Portugal  0.76  −1.61  0.29
Slovakia  −4.93  (2009)  3.35  0.87
Slovenia  6.87  (2007)  −0.17  0.73
Spain 2.71  0.71  1.80
Average  2.4  1.21  1.68
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of  commonly  ﬁxed  interest  rates,  but  it  is  also  true  that  the
Euro  Area  has  suffered  different  inﬂation  rates  starting  from
its  very  foundation  (Table  5).
Obviously,  differences  in  terms  of  prices  are  no  exception
in  monetary  unions  too,  but,  Table  5  evidently  shows  how
stagﬂation  pressures,  i.e.  economic  stagnation  combined
with  inﬂation,  are  plaguing  Southern  European  countries
(Greece,  Italy  and  Spain).  In  any  case,  there  is  no  clear
trend  in  the  evolution  of  the  Harmonized  Consumer  Price
Index  (HCPI),  which  in  turn  means  that  the  Eurozone  is  sub-
ject  to  asymmetric  shocks  (f.i.  deﬂation  in  some  country
groups  and  inﬂation  in  other  nations).  European  institutions
themselves  also  highlight  that  ‘‘a  single  monetary  policy
for  Member  States  that  does  not  fulﬁll  the  conditions  of  an
[optimal  currency  area]  can  produce  different  rates  of  inﬂa-
tion  and  therefore,  different  real  interest  rates,  different
real  exchange  rates  and  large  booms  and  busts  in  different
Member  States  that  need  to  be  dealt  with  to  avoid  serious
breakdowns  of  the  monetary  union’’  (European  Parliament,
2012).  As  Table  5  proves,  the  European  Central  Bank  has  not
been  able  to  accomplish  to  its  own  (and  sole)  task  aiming  at
‘‘keeping  inﬂation  below,  but  close  to,  2%  over  the  medium
term’’  (European  Central  Bank,  2012b).  In  addition,  if  we
look  at  data  resulting  from  national  consumer  price  indexes
(European  Commission,  2012c,d),  the  upward  trend  in  prices
is  even  more  explicit.  But  why  is  it  so?  Or,  more  precisely,
why  the  European  Central  Bank  seems  to  be  unable  to  main-
tain  enduring  price  stability  across  its  member  countries?
Certainly,  ECB’s  ineffectiveness  is  not  (only)  imputable  to
its  course  of  action  or  its  policy  mix,  but  rather  to  any-
body’s  generic  inability  to  formulate  a  common  approach
suitable  for  17  (!)  inhomogeneous  nations.  As  we  will  soon
enough  see,  the  Euro  Area  cannot  be  nearly  compared  to  the
United  States  of  America,  because  EMU  member  countries
w
g
c
aSource: The World Bank Group (2012).
ave  retained  political  autonomy  and  suffer  widening  eco-
omic  divergences.  Precisely  these  dissimilarities  have  been
xperienced  by  the  United  States  of  America  in  the  past
enturies,  but  they  have  been  also  overcome  by  their  fed-
ral  States  thanks  to  their  common  cultural,  linguistic  and
ocial  peculiarities,  which  are  unmistakably  far  away  from
elonging  to  the  Euro  Area.
Even  GDP  growth  rates  are  foreseeably  dissimilar  and
utline  the  intrinsic  impossibility  of  formulating  any  ‘one-
ize-ﬁts-all  solution’  (Table  6).
For  example,  every  economist  and  policy  maker  knows
ow  different  cyclical  interventions  have  to  be  in  good
s  compared  to  bad  times.  In  other  terms,  the  centrally
xed  ECB  interest  rate  as  well  as  the  nominal  ‘one-to-
ne’  correspondence  between  infra-union  exchange  rates
ategorically  impedes  conjunctural  adjustments,  which
haracterize  any  monetarily  sovereign  nation  worldwide.
nless  these  obstacles  to  competitiveness  and  prosperity
ill  be  removed,  the  Eurozone  will  continue  to  suffer  boost-
ng  discrepancies,  which  will  even  more  seal  the  current
eadlocked  situation.  After  all,  even  before  the  creation
f  the  Euro  currency,  several  scientists  were  conscious  that
‘the  ECB  [would]  be  unable  to  rely  on  broad  consensus  over
onetary  policy.  Especially  in  times  of  stagnation  or  crisis,  it
ill  be  the  focus  of  intense  political  pressure  from  business,
abor,  governments,  and  regions  with  divergent  interests’’
Frieden,  1998).  As  commonly  known,  this  is  exactly  what
he  European  Monetary  Union  is  nowadays  undergoing:  for
nstance,  Germany  and  Finland  are  particularly  desirous
f  avoiding  quantitative  easing  (or  any  similar  measures),
hich  are  in  the  contrary  endorsed  by  Southern  country
roups  like  Greece,  Italy  and  Spain.  The  next  future  will
ertainly  prove  that  this  trend  will  not  only  endure,  but  will
lso  become  even  more  pronounced.
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.6.  Cultural  and  social  peculiarities  as
ntrinsically  tying  or  disaggregating  factors
here  is  no  doubt  that  the  Euro  Area  is  inhomogeneous  even
n  cultural  terms.  But  what  kind  of  economic  implications
o  these  divergences  imply?  For  instance,  it  becomes  likely
hat  some  countries  will  be  more  prone  to  promote  anti-
yclical  stimulation  plans  --  also  at  the  cost  of  increasing
nﬂation  in  the  short  term  --  while  policymakers  of  other
ations  will  have  a  rather  different  approach  to  economic
iseases  (‘‘Wasteful  strategic  debt  policy  may  arise  from
onﬂicts  about  the  preferred  stance  of  monetary  policy  both
etween  the  ECB  and  the  ﬁscal  authorities  and  between
eterogeneous  ﬁscal  authorities  themselves’’  (Beetsma  and
ovenberg,  2005)).  These  ﬁndings  can  be  easily  conceived
n  any  monetary  union  made  of  17  member  countries  and
epresent  at  the  same  time  a  source  of  great  uncertainty.
n  fact,  heterogeneity,  which  is  generally  speaking  undoubt-
dly  an  element  of  strength,  can  be  at  the  origin  of  conﬂicts
n  nearly  every  tying  exchange  agreement.  Rightly  so,  the
ormer  French  President  Nicolas  Sarkozy  has  pointed  out  in
 speech  in  Toulon  on  1  December  2011  that  ‘‘we  each  have
ur  history;  we  each  have  our  past  wounds.  When  we  talk
bout  currency,  Germany  remembers  its  history.  We  must
nderstand  that  and  we  must  respect  it.  We  each  have  our
nstitutions,  our  political  culture,  our  concept  of  the  Nation.
n  one  case  it  is  federal  and  in  the  other  unitary.  We  need  to
nderstand  that  difference.  We  must  respect  it’’  (Sarkozy,
011).  Now,  these  assertions  are  profoundly  true  and  should
e  respected,  but  at  the  same  time  it  is  not  possible  to
laim  that  Germany’s  fears  of  inﬂation  necessarily  corre-
pond  to  the  shared  view  in  the  Euro  Area.  Nonetheless,
etting  single  approaches  permeate  the  European  level  too
s  not  easy  and  can  be  at  the  origin  of  huge  conﬂicts,  as  the
urrent  debt  crisis  is  still  showing.  Who  does  not  remember
evolution-like  turmoil  in  Greece,  because  European  author-
ties  were  against  additional  ﬁnancial  help  and  continued
leading  for  further  sacriﬁces?  Perhaps,  skeptics  can  claim
hat  demonstrations  have  also  occurred  in  other  occasions
nd  are  not  necessarily  interlinked  with  currency  unions.
ccording  to  our  analysis,  this  hypothetical  objection  is  only
alf-true,  since  economic  and  monetary  uniﬁcation  (as  the
hrase  itself  recalls)  aims  at  homogenizing  peculiar  charac-
eristics  of  member  economies.  Of  course,  homogenization
s  not  incontrovertibly  bad,  but  it  is  at  least  a  great  chal-
enge  to  be  understood  by  nearly  330  million  citizens  in  the
uro  Area.
.7.  The  indivisibility  of  monetary  and  political
owers
e  already  know  that  the  Treaty  of  Maastricht  (1992)
rescribes  a  rather  precise  separation  between  monetary
owers  in  the  hands  of  the  European  Central  Bank  and
conomic  as  well  as  political  powers,  which  national  Govern-
ents  are  in  charge  of.  Since  monetary  matters  represent
 subcategory  of  economic  responsibilities,  it  is  immedi-
tely  evident  that  there  will  be  huge  conﬂict  potentials
etween  communitarian  and  national  policymakers  or,  more
recisely,  between  ‘one-size-ﬁts-all  solutions’  formulated
t  the  European  level  (concerning  fundamental  elements
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f  economic  policy)  and  tailor  made  measures  decided  at
he  national  level,  which  can  be  in  contrast  with  the  ECB
tself.  In  addition,  there  are  ‘‘grave  doubts  whether  this
ﬁscal  co-ordination]  can  work.  Fiscal  policy  decisions  at
he  EC  level  will  be  subject  to  nationalistic  haggling,  and
entral  cooperation  and  coordination  will  be  limited  by
ach  country’s  desire  to  avoid  a  net  loss  nationally.  Fiscal
olicy  at  the  national  level,  which  already  faces  many  con-
traints,  will  be  further  shackled  by  the  ﬁscal  limits  set  by
he  Maastricht  Treaty.  Monetary  autonomy  will  have  been
bandoned.  Consequently  the  inhabitants  of  each  member
ation  are  likely  to  suffer  a  reduction  in  their  ability  to
ontrol  their  own  economic  destinies.  At  times  of  pres-
ure  and  cyclical  downturn,  they  might  perceive  this  loss
s  greater  than  the  gain  from  preserving  the  single  mar-
et  by  remaining  within  the  monetary  system’’  (McKay,
999).  The  principle  of  the  indivisibility  of  monetary  and
olitical  powers  is  furthermore  interlinked  with  another
ore  term,  namely  sovereignty:  thus,  ‘‘monetary  integra-
ion  involves  a  consideration  of  two  quite  different  types
r  dimensions  of  sovereignty.  One  is  policy  sovereignty,  and
he  other  is  legal  sovereignty.  Policy  sovereignty  refers  to
he  ability  to  conduct  policy  independent  of  commitments
o  other  countries.  Legal  sovereignty  refers  to  the  ability  of
 state  to  make  its  own  laws  without  limitations  imposed
y  any  outside  authority.  Both  concepts  need  to  be  con-
idered  in  plans  for  monetary  unions’’  (Mundell,  2002).  In
act,  the  abandonment  of  monetary  autonomy  cannot  be
eplaced  by  making  (excessive)  recourse  to  ﬁscal  policies,
s  it  nowadays  happens  (Beretta,  2013).  Not  enough,  any
egmentation  between  monetary  and  economic  (e.g.  ﬁscal)
owers  is  not  only  unsupported  by  theoretical  as  well  as
mpirical  evidence,  but  it  also  contravenes  the  principle  of
nivocity  stated  in  Section  2.2.  As  renowned  thinkers  have
n  addition  pointed  out,  ‘‘assigning  to  a  central  bank  in  a
onetary  union  the  sole  duty  of  controlling  price  inﬂation
nd  assigning  to  the  ﬁscal  authorities  the  duty  of  controlling
udget  balances  are  always  less  efﬁcient  than  co-operation
etween  the  authorities’’  (Meade  and  Weale,  1995).  In  the
ight  of  these  observations,  some  ﬁrst  obstacles  to  any
eparation  between  monetary  and  economic  powers  are
anifestly  related  to  efﬁciency  because  of  lacking  partic-
pative  management  between  national  and  communitarian
uthorities  and  effectiveness  due  to  (potentially)  incoher-
nt  economic  policies  at  the  national  as  compared  to  the
uropean  level.  The  same  disturbing  mechanisms  apply  to
rocesses  of  decision  making,  because  they  are  split  into
ational  and  communitarian  competence  levels.  In  fact,  no
roblems  would  subsist,  if  there  would  be  a  political  union
oo.  Plethoricly  enough,  economic  literature  has  been  skep-
ical  on  the  feasibility  of  bringing  about  a  monetary  union
‘without  a  previous  political  union.  [M]onetary  unions  cer-
ainly  cannot  take  place  when  national  governments  are
ot  sufﬁciently  committed  to  it  to  tame  or  compensate
pecial  interests  opposed  to  it,  when  there  are  no  neu-
ral  supranational  institutions  to  mediate  conﬂicts,  when
ome  government  can  monetize  their  ﬁnancial  difﬁculties
t  the  expense  of  their  partners,  when  protectionism  is
ounting,  or  when  hostility  between  nations  is  percepti-
le.  Monetary  union  became  a  victim  of  conﬂicting  national
mbitions,  of  the  banker’s  interest  in  preserving  exchange
roﬁts,  but  also  of  the  lack  of  trust  between  States.  No
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iMemorandum  on  monetary  unions:  The  neglected  evidence  
State  would  yield  its  monetary  sovereignty  knowing  that
it  might  become  partially  liable  for  the  costs  of  ﬁnancial
mismanagement  by  its  neighbor.  Monetary  uniﬁcation  cre-
ated  excessive  and  sometimes  contradictory  expectations
in  its  supporters:  it  could  not  deliver  political  advantage  for
some  governments  and  simultaneously  sustain  peaceful  aspi-
rations,  economic  development,  and  free  trade’’  (Einaudi,
2000).  At  the  latest,  as  soon  as  national  and  communitarian
decision  makers  (will)  start  thinking  differently  in  economic,
monetary  and/or  political  terms,  the  exchange  agreement
will  begin  to  be  innerly  threatened.
2.8.  The  trinomial  of  monetary  unions,  moral
hazard and  ‘too  big  to  fail’  diagnosis
The  phrase  ‘too  big  to  fail’  is  often  used  in  relation  to
banks  and  ﬁnancial  institutions.  Despite  that,  this  formu-
lation  seems  to  be  even  more  applicable  in  the  case  of
EMU  countries.  Why  is  it  so?  Well,  it  is  a  fact  that  Italy,
Spain  or  even  Greece  are  nations  in  trouble,  which  are
at  the  same  time  treated  as  unrenounceable  or,  precisely,
‘too  big  to  fail’.  Now,  it  is  quite  sure  that,  if  countries
like  Italy  and  Spain  should  be  bailed  out,  communitar-
ian  ﬁnancial  resources  would  be  insufﬁcient  (‘too  big  to
bail’).  Nonetheless,  the  message  we  want  to  deliver  here
is  precisely  that,  because  of  the  permanent  menace  of
reversibility  (Section  2.3)  and  the  roped  party  effect  (Sec-
tion  2.4),  currency  unions  are  constantly  menaced  by  their
intrinsic  faults.  As  prominent  economists  have  also  pointed
out,  ‘‘the  credibility  of  exchange-rate  commitments  under
the  nineteenth-century  gold  standard  was  supported  by  spe-
cial  circumstances  not  present  today.  Past  experience  thus
suggests  that  many  of  the  beneﬁts  of  currency  uniﬁcation
can  in  principle  be  reaped  through  the  maintenance  of
ﬁrmly  ﬁxed  exchange  rates  between  distinct  national  cur-
rencies.  Experience  also  suggests,  however,  that  the  special
circumstances  conferring  credibility  to  governments’  com-
mitments  to  ﬁxed  rates  in  earlier  years  are  not  present  in
Europe  today’’  (Eichengreen,  1992).  It  is  therefore  plethoric
enough  to  claim  that  every  single  source  of  crisis  affecting
system-relevant  member  countries  is  treated  as  a  cause  of
disease,  which  is  likely  to  spread  to  the  currency  area  as  a
whole.  This  is  obviously  so,  because  the  Euro  is  conceived
as  the  sum  of  reputation  levels,  economic  performances  and
affection  for  the  common  currency  showed  by  each  mem-
ber  nation.  At  the  same  time,  EMU  members  are  exposed
to  a  devious  incentive  to  behave  hazardously  in  economic
terms.  In  fact,  as  soon  as  Governments  become  cognizant
of  their  systemic  relevance  for  the  stability  of  the  Euro  cur-
rency  itself,  they  become  likely  to  act  in  a  prejudicial  as
well  as  imprudent  way,  because  they  assume  to  beneﬁt  from
the  communitarian  agreements:  ‘‘should  indebted  countries
inside  a  monetary  union  themselves  believe  that  a  bail-out
mechanism  exists,  they  may  be  encouraged  to  be  less  ﬁs-
cally  prudent  than  otherwise.  [.  .  .] In  order  to  counter  moral
hazard,  the  monetary  union  must  combine  a  binding  ‘no  bail-
out’  rule  with  stringent  rules  preventing  any  member  of  a
monetary  union  incurring  levels  of  debt  that  are  not  sustain-
able.  [.  .  .] In  particular,  it  seemed  that  insufﬁcient  attention
was  given  [.  .  .] to  the  total  level  of  a  nation’s  outstanding
sovereign  debt,  indicating,  perhaps,  that  moral  hazard  had
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ecome  and  endemic  feature  of  the  dynamics  of  European
onetary  union’’  (Scott,  2012).  Probably,  the  moral  haz-
rd  phenomenon  deriving  from  the  ‘too  big  to  fail’  status
as  heavily  characterized  some  decisions  before,  but  less
uring  the  current  crisis.  Thus,  economies  in  trouble  have
apidly  realized  that  communitarian  loans  would  be  granted
nly  under  heavy  conditionalities.  Despite  that,  admonitions
rom  economically  ‘virtuous’  countries  cannot  have  nothing
ore  than  a low  impact  on  Italy’s  and  Spain’s  policy  deci-
ions,  because  both  the  ‘virtuous’  and  the  ‘vicious’  know
hat  the  European  Monetary  Union  has  to  rely  on  them.  Evi-
ently,  this  kind  of  scenario  cannot  be  deﬁned  as  a  win-win
ituation,  since  it  is  prejudicial  to  the  European  project  in
ts  entirety.
.9.  The  bad  deal  of  bartering  exchange  rate  risks
or sovereign  risks
et  us  make  a  ﬁrst  statement,  which  should  appear  objec-
ive  even  in  the  eyes  of  skeptical  readers:  currency  unions
liminate  infra-union  exchange  rate  risks,  while  ‘‘exchange-
ate  risk  is  [.  . .] associated  only  with  international  trade’’
Eudey,  1998).  Manifestly,  no  ﬂuctuations  can  occur,  if  mem-
er  countries  decide  to  abolish  their  national  currencies
nd  adopt  a  new,  common  one.  In  a similar  way,  the  Euro
emains  subject  to  appreciation  and  depreciation  risks  with
espect  to  the  remaining  foreign  currencies  (f.i.  the  US-
ollar),  although  this  characteristic  is  shared  by  nearly  every
oney  unit  in  today’s  ﬂoating  regimes.  What  is  signiﬁcantly
ifferent  and  represents  a  dramatic  threat  to  the  Euro-
one  itself  is  that  exchange  rate  risks  have  been  literally
artered  against  augmented  sovereign  default  risks.  While
he  ﬁrst  risk  typology  is  likely  to  positively  as  well  as  nega-
ively  affect  the  external  sector  of  national  economies  --  it  is
herefore  a  vox  media  in  economic  science  --  increased  expo-
ure  to  State’s  bankruptcy  is  evidently  a  greater  (and  more
oncrete)  matter  of  concern.  But  why  should  the  Eurozone
uddenly  become  potentially  more  vulnerable  to  sovereign
efaults?  Once  again,  because  of  the  peculiar  exchange  rate
egime,  namely  the  establishment  of  a monetary  union,
hich  has  ‘conﬁscated’  some  essential  policy  tools.
For  instance,  although  (nearly)  every  economist  should
e  conscious  that  central  banks  cannot  create  positive
alues,  namely  real  wealth,  from  scratch  or  through  over-
ssuing  money,  it  is  also  clear  that  they  can  either  lend
he  Government  part  of  their  liquidity  without  (strict)  con-
itionalities  or  temporarily  over-issue  money  to  purchase
ublic  bonds  and  reﬁnance  the  public  sector.  In  order  to
void  inﬂationary  repercussions,  this  over-issue  of  money
hould  be  a  sort  of  anticipated  monetization  of  future  earn-
ngs  and  therefore  gradually  be  reabsorbed.  Despite  its  huge
onetary  powers,  the  European  Central  Bank  cannot  be
onsidered  as  a  ‘true’  lender  of  last  resort,  because  its  (self-
mposed)  task  ﬁeld  is  stubbornly  limited  by  law  to  some
articular  economic  aspects  like  ﬁghting  inﬂation  (‘‘The
ain  objective  of  the  Eurosystem  is  to  maintain  price  stabil-
ty:  safeguarding  the  value  of  the  Euro’’  (European  Central
ank,  2013)).  In  addition,  no  central  bank  can  claim  to  be
alled  ‘lender  of  last  resort’  and  contemporarily  attach  huge
and  preposterous)  conditionalities  to  any  (although  extraor-
inary)  credit  concession  to  its  member  countries.  Since  EMU
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ations  have  become  well  aware  of  this  huge  loss  to  contrast
conomic  crises,  they  tend  to  wait  before  asking  for  ﬁnan-
ial  helps  (cf.  Spain).  In  the  meantime,  States  are  forced  to
ither  borrow  additional  funds  on  ﬁnancial  markets,  which
ormally  require  high  interest  payments,  or  dramatically
ncrease  taxation  at  the  national  level  as  shown  in  Beretta
2013)  by  comparing  the  VAT  standard  rate  pre-EMU  with  the
AT  standard  rate  during  EMU.  According  to  our  ﬁndings,  this
rend  seems  to  affect  the  Euro  Area  as  a  whole,  although  it
s  more  pronounced  in  economically  troubled  countries.
Furthermore,  as  economic  history  well  teaches,  several
overnments  have  fought  (and  reabsorbed)  public  indebt-
dness  through  currency  devaluation  and  augmented  price
evels.  According  to  this  scenario,  the  national  economy
ould  be  stimulated  to  increase  commercial  exports.  By
oing  so,  the  country  would  be  able  to  earn  more  foreign
urrencies  from  international  trade,  expand  its  domestic
roduction  and  eventually  lower  the  debt  burden.  Since
xchange  rates  are  nominally  ﬁxed  for  ‘poorer’  as  well  as
richer’  countries,  the  ﬁrst  cannot  anymore  devaluate  their
urrency,  although  the  communitarian  exchange  value  does
learly  not  reﬂect  the  economic  performance  of  each  mem-
er  nation.  In  this  regard,  there  is  no  doubt  that,  if  some
outhern  European  countries  would  regain  inﬂuence  over
heir  exchange  rates,  the  ﬁnancial  and  debt  crisis  would  not
ave  reached  the  current  contagion-like  dimension.As  an  additional  matter  of  fact,  it  is  pretty  usual  that  pub-
ic  indebtedness  decreases  in  times  of  upswinging  economic
rowth  due  to  higher  tax  inﬂows  and  increases  during  eco-
omic  turmoil  because  of  higher  unemployment  and  lower
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Table  7  Gross  Fixed  Capital  Formation  (GFCF)  by  sectors.
Total
(bn  D  )
State
(bn  D  )
Contribution  to  total  amou
(as  %)
European  Monetary  Union
2002  1482.6  178.7  12.05  
2011 1805.6  219.6  12.16  
European Union
2002  1949.9  232.7  11.93  
2011 2347.6  316.8  13.49  
Germany
1991 356.75  39.86  11.17  
2001 421.74  38.88  9.22  
2011 469.85  42.68  9.08  
Japan
1991 905  135.9  15.02  
2001 1130.2  231.6  20.49  
2011 873.4  139.7  15.99  
United Kingdom
1991  154.4  19.1  12.37  
2001 276.1  24.5  8.87  
2011 248.1  38.3  15.44  
United States  of  America
1991  780  117.7  15.09  
2001 2221.4  288.5  12.99  
2011 1582.2  248.6  15.71  
Source: European Commission (2012a,b).E.  Beretta
DP  growth  rates.  Of  course,  this  logical  chain  is  not  an
conomic  dogma,  which  must  be  always  true.  Nonethe-
ess,  it  is  correct  to  claim  that  there  is  a  pronounced  trend
oward  the  scenario  described  above:  in  the  light  of  this,
‘the  sensitivity  of  debt  crises  to  growth  slowdowns  makes
t  particularly  important  to  have  sound  growth  forecast-
ng  practices’’  (Easterly,  2011).  Now,  since  EMU  members
re  not  anymore  allowed  to  get  indebted  over  the  ‘magic’
hreshold  of  0.5  per  cent  (as  compared  to  yearly  GDP),  it
s  pretty  evident  that  countries  in  trouble  will  not  beneﬁt
nymore  from  the  previous  degree  of  monetary  sovereignty,
hich  would  permit  them  to  regain  some  monetary  agility.
Last  but  not  least,  what  do  the  United  States  of  Amer-
ca,  England  or  Japan  have  in  monetary  terms,  which  the
uro  Area  does  not  have?  Once  again,  the  ﬁrst  country
roup  is  monetarily  sovereign,  which  should  of  course  not  be
egarded  as  a particular  or  even  privileged  status!  Nonethe-
ess,  it  is  quite  sure  that  the  Eurozone  cannot  count  on
entral  banking  institutions  like  the  Federal  Reserve  Banks,
he  Bank  of  England  or  the  Bank  of  Japan.  This  is  true  not
ecause  the  European  Monetary  Union  has  (self-evidently)
ts  own  organizations,  but  because  EMU  members  cannot
nymore  take  advantage  from  some  fundamental  ‘privi-
eges’  in  terms  of  monetary  ﬂexibility  as  other  leading
ountries  worldwide  still  can.  Now,  these  assertions  do  not
necessarily)  provide  enough  evidence  to  show  why  the  Euro
rea  has  literally  bartered  zero-level  exchange  rate  risks  for
ncreased  sovereign  default  risks.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  even
ermany,  namely  the  ‘virtuous’  country  par  excellence,  has
ost  some  part  of  its  monetary  adaptability,  which  has  been
nt Other  sectors
(bn  D  )
Contribution  to  total  amount
(as  %)
1303.9  87.95
1585.7  87.82
1717.2  88.07
2030.8  86.51
316.89  88.83
382.86  90.78
427.17  90.92
769.1  84.98
898.6  79.51
733.7  84.01
135.3  87.63
251.6  91.13
209.8  84.56
662.3  84.91
1922.9  86.56
1333.6  84.29
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iMemorandum  on  monetary  unions:  The  neglected  evidence  
mainly  compensated  through  increased  taxation  levels  and
less  proneness  to  public  spending.
For  instance,  Table  7  sums  up  the  main  trends  in  Gross
Fixed  Capital  Formation  (GFCF)  by  sectors.  In  this  speciﬁc
regard,  it  clearly  appears  that  the  public  sectors  of  EMU
countries  as  a  whole  contribute  less  to  the  stock  of  capital
goods  than  Japan,  the  United  Kingdom  as  well  as  the  United
States  of  America,  which  are  our  (monetarily  sovereign)
terms  of  comparison,  while  the  German  State,  which  is  at
the  head  of  a  particularly  innovative  country,  invests  even
less  than  the  rest  of  the  Euro  Area.  Interestingly  enough,  the
public  sector  of  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  United  States  of
America,  which  are  traditionally  neoliberal  countries,  seem
to  be  more  prone  to  be  actively  involved  in  investing  in  new
capital  goods  than  the  Eurozone  as  a  whole.
According  to  our  analysis,  these  results  are  not  unex-
plainable,  because  the  Eurozone  and  its  members  are  the
only  country  groups,  which  have  to  cut  public  expenses  to
satisfy  communitarian  budgetary  constraints  and  to  comply
with  their  inability  to  make  use  of  (expansive)  monetary
policies.  Empirical  evidence  is  particularly  strong  and  addi-
tionally  corroborated  by  data  for  the  European  Union,  which
consists  of  27  (instead  of  17)  members.  Now,  although  17  EU
nations  are  also  part  of  the  Euro  Area,  the  public  sectors
of  the  remaining  10  countries  are  so  active  in  contributing
to  the  Gross  Fixed  Capital  Formation  (GFCF)  --  evidently,
because  of  not  being  afﬁliated  to  the  Eurozone  and,  there-
fore,  subject  to  its  constraints  --  that  they  contribute  to
raising  the  average  from  12.16  (cf.  EMU)  to  13.49  per  cent
(cf.  EU)  in  2011!  Reduced  public  investments  are  only  one
consequence  of  the  European  currency  arrangement,  which
prevents  member  countries  from  counting  on  their  own
central  bank  (and,  of  course,  its  benevolence  in  granting
credits)  and  forces  (at  least,  the  most  ‘virtuous’)  nations
to  cut  their  expenses  and  proactively  save  resources.  This
(though  necessary)  way  of  doing  leads  to  greater  exposure
to  cyclical  effects  in  bad  times  and,  more  generally,  to  more
limited  policy  tools  in  crises.  In  fact,  there  is  wide  accep-
tance  of  the  ‘golden  rule’  (tracing  back  to  decades  ago)
that  ‘‘in  a  crisis  characterized  by  the  existence  of  unem-
ployed  factors  the  task  is  to  direct  the  economy  toward  full
employment,  through  a  determined  expansion  of  investment
over  saving,  and  effective  utilization  of  public  investment
for  this  purpose;  in  a  condition  of  full  employment,  to  stabi-
lize  the  economy  by  creating  and  maintaining  an  equilibrium
between  saving  and  investment;  and,  ﬁnally,  in  the  case  of
eventual  inﬂationary  expansion  of  investment  over  saving
in  a  fully  employed  economy,  cautiously  to  restore  equilib-
rium’’  (Richter-Altschäffer,  1938).  Obviously,  if  some  EMU
Governments  are  not  well  aware  of  these  constrictions  and
do  not  proactively  reduce  their  expenses,  they  will  soon  or
later  get  in  trouble  and  ask  for  ﬁnancial  helps.  And  this  is
precisely  what  is  going  on  in  Cyprus,  Greece,  Italy,  Portu-
gal,  Spain:  under  these  conditions,  there  is  little  doubt  that
other  countries  will  follow!
3. ConclusionThe  European  common  currency  is  severely  endangered
by  its  intrinsic  characteristics,  which  are  also  responsible
for  having  dramatically  reduced  the  intervention  ability
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f  policymakers.  Of  course,  credibility  and  reputation,
hich  should  be  doubtlessly  implied  by  super-ﬁx  currency
egimes,  have  no  chance  to  assert  themselves  in  the  pres-
nce  of  widening  divergences  between  17  unequal  member
ountries.  Under  these  conditions,  the  European  Central
ank  (ECB)  will  continue  to  be  unable  to  formulate  appropri-
te  economic  policies,  which  cannot  obviously  be  recessive
or  one  country  group  and  inﬂationary  for  other  nations.  This
aradigmatic  dilemma  is  precisely  the  result  of  the  ‘one  size
ts  all’  approach  characterizing  the  Euro  currency  itself:  as
oon  as  discrepancies  and  imbalances  prevail,  the  situation
ets  out  of  control.
Now,  what  should  European  policymakers  do  in  order
o  restore  conﬁdence  in  the  Euro  Area?  First  of  all,  they
hould  unmistakably  decide  between  two  possible  alterna-
ive  paths:
 rescuing  the  Euro  currency  and  the  exchange  agreement;
 not  rescuing  the  Euro  currency  and  the  exchange  agree-
ment.
Although  this  is  a  very  simple  question,  it  seems  to  sub-
ist  no  unequivocal  consensus  on  it.  In  fact,  if  policymakers
pt  to  rescue  the  Euro  currency  and  the  exchange  agree-
ent,  there  should  be  no  hesitation  in  letting  the  European
entral  Bank  (ECB)  purchase  bonds  issued  by  Governments
f  countries  in  economic  trouble.  In  fact,  some  of  them
re  not  anymore  able  to  reﬁnance  themselves  autonomously
n  the  ﬁnancial  markets  (Table  1).  Obviously,  the  central
ank  should  become  aware  enough  of  its  crucial  role  and
olicy  tools  to  break  the  current  bottleneck.  In  fact,  the
uropean  Central  Bank  (ECB)  already  has  all  these  (unused)
nstruments  and  monetary  powers,  which  are  typical  for
very  central  bank  of  countries  (or  country  groups)  like
ngland,  Japan,  the  United  States  of  America  and,  of  course,
he  Euro  Area.  Furthermore,  economic  growth  should  be
timulated  even  at  the  cost  of  (temporary  and  managed)
ncreases  in  public  indebtedness  of  some  countries.  Other-
ise  stated,  there  can  be  no  prolonged  debt  reimbursement
ithout  sustained  economic  growth.  In  addition,  communi-
arian  institutions  should  pay  more  attention  to  imbalances
nd  divergences  in  the  Euro  Area  itself.  In  fact,  there  can
e  no  sustainability  in  the  Eurozone  unless  there  is  profound
onvergence  in  real  terms.  For  sure,  this  process  of  homoge-
ization  will  last  at  least  several  years  (if  not  decades),  but
t  is  a  necessary  step  toward  true  integration.
Otherwise,  if  there  is  no  agreement  on  rescuing  the  Euro
urrency,  the  member  countries  of  the  Eurozone  should
ither  reconvert  their  currency  stocks  into  national  money
nits  or  (try  to)  maintain  the  Euro  as  a  medium  of  payments
or  international  transactions.  Since  it  is  easily  conceiv-
ble  that  European  politicians  will  not  abandon  the  project
f  monetary  uniﬁcation,  we  prefer  to  abstain  from  deep-
ning  this  last  scenario  (Beretta,  2011,  2012a,b,c).  What
emains  profoundly  true  is  that  the  Euro  Area  is  condemned
o  failure  in  absence  of  structural  interventions  aiming  at
estoring  a  minimal  degree  of  consideration  for  heterogene-
ty.  In  fact,  we  think  of  the  ‘one  size  ﬁts  all’  approach
s  the  true  ‘original  sin’  attached  to  the  Eurozone,  which
as  not  realized  the  intrinsic  faults  of  monetary  unions  and
rtiﬁcial  currencies.  On  the  contrary,  economic  and  social
iversity  should  be  treated  as  a  source  of  great  beneﬁts
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nd  strengths  in  the  worldwide  arena.  For  sure,  if  poli-
ymakers  will  continue  to  frown  upon  different  economic
rends  in  different  European  countries,  there  will  be  limited
lace  for  a  community  of  people,  traditions  and  peaceful
oexistence.  Precisely  these  inestimably  precious  charac-
eristics  are  nowadays  seriously  endangered  by  economic
easures,  which  do  not  reﬂect  common  feelings  of  all  Euro-
ean  peoples  and  are  regarded  with  distrust  because  of  their
top-down’  approach.  Unless  the  Euro  will  get  rid  of  its  main
aults,  EMU  member  countries  should  constantly  be  well
repared  to  rescue  their  common  currency  ad  inﬁnitum.  . .
 .  .but  ‘‘a  currency,  which  has  to  be  rescued,  is  not  anymore
 currency’’  (Hankel,  2012  (own  translation)).
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